The Existence of the Soul: Philosophy, Not Neuroscience
by Melissa Cain Travis
In the first part of this series on the existence of the soul, “Man: Mind Over Matter or Mindful Matter?” I made the claim that “Some of the deep problems that plague physicalism cannot be solved by simply understanding the material brain better. They transcend neuroscience.” Remember, physicalism is the view that we are nothing more than our physical bodies and everything about us, from consciousness to higher rationality, can be explained by biochemical processes. In philosopher-speak: I am identical with my material body. In this installment, I will discuss one of the several major problems with this view.
Many physicalists (both theist and non-theist) point to the great strides the neurosciences have made in correlating brain states (neuron firing patterns) with mental states (conscious experiences). For instance, if stimulation of brain region Q in a subject who is anesthetized but awake results in the subject reporting an experience of tasting an orange, the physicalist conclusion is that the mental state (tasting an orange) simply is an event in brain region Q. They are one and the same thing, and there is no need to posit a soul to explain the conscious experience. This is known as mind-brain identity theory.
I believe this conclusion is unjustified, and my reasons have nothing to do with the hard sciences. In fact, the problems with mind-brain identity theory would not diminish even if neuroscience manages to one day have comprehensive knowledge of brain physiology. Here I will discuss just one of the problems.
We know from the principle of identity that in order for mental events (M) to simply be brain events (B), everything that is true of M must be true of B, or else they are not one and the same thing. Reflecting upon the properties of M and B, we can see that they do, in fact, have different properties…
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