Reality and Radical Skepticism
By Arthur Khachatryan
There was a time when notions of the obvious were so simply eloquent that there was no need to meddle with its argumentation. In fact, there was no argumentation needed since the obvious was so, well obvious. Then came the postmodernist, deconstructionist ideologies that aimed to topple the towers of fundamental knowledge and question the nature of truth itself. Radical skepticism opened the door to the unknown and the unknown became all things to all people in all ways. From the perilous skepticism of Satan in the garden of Eden questioning God’s command, “Has God really said?” to the prevailing cultural redefinition of words and ideas in the latter half of the 20th century onward, skepticism about the known world has found safe harbor in the arms of the culture that embraces it for the tolerance of its misguidedness.
By eliminating reality, postmodernists takes aim at knowable truth and quickly demolishes the understanding of right and wrong paving the way for a culture that seeks this freedom to overthrow what is thought to be “the totalitarian regime” that has reigned over it. Quickly, ideas are made relative, truths are redefined as preferences and wrongs are rationalized by deconstruction. But how can we doubt things that are so obvious? We can do it only after a slow deterioration of the fabric of reality, only after we’ve slowly amputated descriptions from facts, and only on the heels of the movement which gradually alters our perception of the world.
Naturally, radical skepticism steps forward and proclaims that we can not have accurate knowledge about the physical reality that exists outside our minds. But what evidence could possibly be presented for this? Is it not merely an imagined doubt of reality and not really anything practical that we have to answer to? After all imagining a doubt isn’t the same as actually doubting. Just because there is no logical contradiction in doubting reality does not mean we have adequate justification for doubting it. The mere possibility of doubt does not give us sufficient grounds for it.
When such a possibility is asserted that reality is imagined, all we really have is the skeptic’s mere assertion of a mere logical possibility…